/g/ - Technology

>>308 (OP) 
>Bazzell

Don't get me started on this guy. He saw some top secret shit. Shit his pants on how bad it all is. I think he realized that all the tech the gov has to spy on citizens can be used against him and his glowie butt buddies, and that it would be easy for citizens he previously investigated to hunt him and his family down using plain old OSINT. So thats why he wrote the books. But he's a fucking boomer that doesn't know anything about physics so that's why he talks about phones, and trusts the post office to not have a sigredux tranny asset to go through your PO box and steam open your parcels. On graphene, it's the best for phones, but us nazi terrorists shouldn't be using phones. The 4G 5G LTE baseband processor inside all phones has elevated privileges with whoever controls or hacks the towers, to do whatever they want to your phone. No hacking required as the baseband processor is essentially it's own self contained bug on your device, closed source that you don't control but instead whoever is sucking the telecom ceo's cock or blackmailing him. So even graphene makes all the pointless. Not to mention the SIGINT problems of using phones in general.

Also if you go on their forums and mention stuff like this, their mods say shit like "what do you need this level of privacy for" on a privacy forum lmao.

>>310
Typo: Considering the closed sourced baseband processor which is essentially another computer on top of your phones computer, even using graphene is pointless. The hardware is already hacked to begin with. Doesn't matter which OS you're using.

>>310
>their mods say shit like "what do you need this level of privacy for" on a privacy forum lmao.
Because they're compromised. Simple as that. I was on nulled a year before it shut down and asked the mods what their data retention policy was. They not only flipped out, but refused to answer the question (in a similar manner to the above statement). They're controlled opposition which means they're told how to behave and allowed to exist.

>>310
lol. I feel the entire privacy biz is only meant to make people feel safe from lower level opponents while being completely powerless against real threats. It's like you say with the post office renting he suggests, you really think a place full of cameras with staff trained to keep an eye out for people (and in my case, asking for photo ID up front) is going to make you anon? Only for your mail order contacts, the government has already made it so they're in the middle of all these communications and transactions.

Most of these security contractor people are part of the glow ring and can't really talk about what methods would actually work or just how bad it is. Once you sign up you can't leak, and if you can't leak you have to perpetuate the lie that using iphones and renting PO boxes with online credit cards, using hotspots with open source tech for phone calls etc is actually going to protect you. When actually it's just a huge bunch of flags that accomplished the exact inverse of what you expected. Turtles all the way down.

>>312
The SNA is largely composed of people who do contract work. Their real full time job is infultraiting other companies to install zero days and other nefarious shit. Most of this work goes on in the "PrIvAcY" infotech sector. Yeah, those security forums are largely ran by 300lb glowing autistic groomers

>>310
>>311
I believe you both are misunderstanding the difference between privacy and security. If a state actor knows your imei was at the scene of a crime you have far more to worry about than a cell tower attack. 

It is important to consider that, at least with graphene, your phone does not send or receive signals sent out by cell towers at all while in airplane mode. If you still don't trust the device you can leave it in a faraday cage with an ethernet cable. The drawbacks that come with using the cell network exist regardless of operating system, even if you had an open source broadband chip the cell network would still be tracking your sim's location at all times, there is no operating system that can prevent this. 

True anonymity can only be obtained by using an older mediatek chip that allows rotating your imei and periodically purchasing a new burner sim. This method has its drawbacks aswell, using an older chip will likely not support newer bands or security patches.

True anonymity, while also retaining your ability to phone family and friends might look something like the following:

A phone identified to you remaining in your basement indefinitely forwarding calls and texts to your laptop or real 'everyday' phone. As long as your everyday phone remains on airplane mode and has mac address spoofing authorities will assume you remain in your basement.

Something like this is the best of both worlds but of course is less anonymous than simply not using a phone at all. As a rule of thumb, if you are using the cell network assume every byte of data, your current location, call transcripts, et al is being recorded and stored for further analysis.

>>374
That's fairly clever. Unfortunately the moment you have a number you have an address for themn to bug and docks every time they ping you.  The odd OS choice also causes you to stand out, which is the exact opposite of the plan. 

The real gamers don't do anything piv-sec related except basic stuff they market to internet retards. It's kind of sad how entrenched the panopticon is

>>375
>The odd OS choice also causes you to stand out, which is the exact opposite of the plan. 
Graphene OS is stock android with small changes to the memory allocator, sandboxing, and telemetry. As i have done a bit of research on how android initiates calls to the baseband professor it is unlikely any external source would know you are using graphene os or receive any os information at all, just that you initiated a call.

>Unfortunately the moment you have a number you have an address for themn to bug and docks every time they ping you
If you'd like there is also jmp.chat which allows you to use a phone number over xmpp, i havent personally tried it myself but i have heard good things and it cuts out the physical address entirely. If that is your threat model perhaps voip services or dumping the cell network entirely is better suited.

>>376
Thanks for looking into this. I am still surveying my options. It can't stick out. The deeper mold is removing GPS, speakers, and microphones until you insert one yourself. There are /g/ critics of the graphene team

>>377
I am quite a strong advocate of the graphene team because, in my personal experience, its arguably the most secure mobile os outside of perhaps linux phones. There are many critics of the graphene team because of the way copperhead split off into calyx and graphene, plus the founder is a bit of a sperg but honestly thats just another plus in my book. I would take the complaints with a grain of salt as the os simply is the best android rom out there for privacy and security, i am sure many feds profit off the drama by dissuading potential users (there are a few android cves that did not effect graphene users).

At the end of the day though the choice is yours and I wish you all the best in your search.

>>378
What do you think of linageOS?

>>379
LineageOS is AOSP with a bit of polish, think of it perhaps as the Windows install that comes with a brand new laptop. Drivers come preinstalled and perhaps a couple apps but other than that the OS is provided exactly as Microsoft, or in our case Google, intended. Many of the custom roms are contributed to by volunteers and often do not push up to date security patches at the speed the graphene team does, I wouldn't really consider it a privacy or security rom by any means.

Disregarding that, I find the project quite fascinating and flashed it on an old samsung tablet i had lying around. Its a neat project but not really my taste.

>>378
There doesn't seem to be any other options for smartphones outside of pinephone, which is evidently a nightmare and not even privacy conscious for messaging. We need every single normie using encrypted sms as their standard platform from the top down at this point, our situation is beyond ridiculous digitally. 

Anyways. you win, I will look into this

>>381
>We need every single normie using encrypted sms... at this point
Most do without even noticing, iMessage has post quantum encryption but can be circumvented by lousy apple id passwords and icloud backups. Can be bruteforced, but thousands of times more secure than standard sms. Just something to keep in mind and the primary reason I still use iMessage while on android.

qubes-airgap.png
[Hide] (62.2KB, 809x584) Reverse

LineageOS and GrapheneOS run binary blob kernel modules. The devices that you could run LineageOS or GrapheneOS on have closed source software running on other cores. Your Linux kernel and Android stack run with the least privilege on that system-on-chip.
If you are seriously serious about mobile security, run a Libre build of GrapheneOS on a Pine64 board, run the network edge on another board, run on another board the chip that talks to the cell towers. Maybe the last board should be some commodity Android device with microphone/camera/sensors surgically removed and detachable to go into multiple Faraday bag layers when appropriate.
Find a four to five inch capacative multitouch USB touchscreen to interface with "user board".
Don't forget a hardware security module, tamper detection to trigger "panic" (wipe HSM) in the chassis, Argon2id based key recalculation with hardware wallet, and safe yet reachable panic button.

Qubes Air style.

If you're the type to kvetch you can't "just buy" this because you can't build this for yourself and for others, then you aren't white (and I am pointing and laughing at you behind seven proxies all the way over here you kikeniggerfaggot).

https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi21/presentation/fri-keynote
https://pine64.com
https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/Startek-Custom-Industrial-RGB-Display-Panel_1601042924024.html
https://nitrokey.com
https://www.zymbit.com/secure-edge-node-400/
http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/news/2018/01/22/qubes-air/

>>383
Apple is not a trustworthy company. SMS is all in the clear and that's how the cattle talk. You cannot trust a top down effort to organize this concept because it's entirely by design for them to spi on your messages

>>384
>Argon2id based key recalculation with hardware wallet, and safe yet reachable panic button.
> if you're dumb you aren't white
I got the rest but why would you have a hardware wallet on your phone, please explain

At this point just go straight qubes with a sim pci card and forward the card into your android x86 or blissos vm.

Do you own any pine64 hardware? I was really interested a couple years ago but I read reviews stating that its not really ready for the average user (camera sensor is shit and driver issues). Also why do all of this instead of just running a stock pinephone, they have killswitches for all the components you listed and have the modem on a seperate usb bus?

Leaving this below incase anyone on here owns one, if this works ill buy a pinephone tomorrow.
https://forum.pine64.org/showthread.php?tid=16752

>>385
There is a difference though, anyone can walk up to your isp with a fake id and receive transcripts of every text you've ever sent out on a phone number, the same cannot be said for iMessage. As long as you and your recipient have icloud backups disabled (which is unlikely) the entire conversation is stored on your device, recent ios versions even have 'post-quantum' encryption and contact key verification (which will notify you if the user has texted you from a different device). Now I am not an apple shill by any means and I am aware the solution is to use a different service altogether but good luck getting a girl you met at a pub to download something like simplex or session, the basic encryption of iMessage is better than nothing imo. 

RCS could be a viable alternative but then you are merely relying on google instead of apple; although the protocol is open google runs nearly all the servers atm, it needs google play services running to verify your phone number, and all external providers need a license from google to communicate with the network. I'll probably drop iMessage for RCS when a privacy respecting provider pops up, but until then I won't hold my breath.

>>375
I do these things as a regular chud so at least I can very slightly help by putting more "flags" on the map.

very likely doesn't do anything since they can profile, but I'll pretend